Operation Ostra Brama

Contents

Operacja Ostra Brama
Part of Operation Tempest, World War II

Dislocation of Polish and German units at the start of the fighting
Date 6–15 July 1944
Location Vilnius, present-day Lithuania (pre-1939 Polish: Wilno, pre-war Poland)
Result Soviet victory
Strategic Polish Home Army defeat
Belligerents
Polish Secret State (Armia Krajowa) Germany  Soviet Union
Commanders and leaders
Aleksander Krzyżanowski
Antoni Olechnowicz
Czesław Dębicki
Rainer Stahel Ivan Chernyakhovsky
Strength
12,500 30,000 Unknown
Casualties and losses
~500 Unknown

Operation Ostra Brama (lit. Operation Gate of Dawn) was an armed conflict during World War II between the Polish Home Army and the Nazi German occupiers of Vilnius (Polish: Wilno). It began on 7 July 1944, as part of a Polish national uprising, Operation Tempest, and lasted until 14 July 1944. Though the Germans were defeated, the following day the Soviet Red Army entered the city and the Soviet NKVD proceeded to intern Polish soldiers and to arrest their officers. Several days later, the remains of the Polish Home Army retreated into the forests, and the Soviets were in control of the city.

There are some controversies involved in determining the result of the battle. From the Polish point of view, while the German defeat constitutes a Polish tactical victory, the ensuing destruction of the Polish units by the Soviets resulted in a strategic defeat, especially considering the goals of Operation Tempest. From the Soviet point of view, the operation was a complete success, as both the Germans and the Poles loyal to the London government suffered a defeat.

Uprising

On 12 June 1944 General Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski, Commander-in-Chief of the Home Army, issued an order to prepare a plan of liberating Vilnius from German hands. The Home Army districts of Vilnius and Navahrudak planned to take control of the city before the Soviets could reach it. The Commander of the Home Army District in Vilnius, then Wilno, General Aleksander Krzyżanowski "Wilk", decided to regroup all the partisan units in the northeastern part of Poland for the assault, both from inside the city and from the outside.

The starting date was set to 7 July. Approximately 12,500 Home Army soldiers attacked the German garrison and managed to seize most of the city center. Heavy street fighting in the outskirts lasted until 14 July. In Vilnius' eastern suburbs, the Home Army units cooperated with reconnaissance groups of the Soviet 3rd Belorussian Front.[1]

Soviets enter

General Krzyżanowski wanted to group all of the partisan units into a re-created Polish 19th Infantry Division. However, the advancing Red Army entered the city on 15 July and the NKVD started to intern all Polish soldiers. On 16 July the HQ of the 3rd Belorussian Front invited Polish officers to a meeting and arrested them.[2][3][4]

The internees, almost 5,000 officers, NCOs and soldiers, were sent to a provisional internment camp in Medininkai, a Vilnius suburb. Some of them were given the option of joining the 1st Polish Army which was integrated into the Soviet armed forces, while the majority were sent to the USSR.[5]

Subsequently, the remnants of the local Home Army HQ ordered all units to retreat to Rūdininkai Forest. It is estimated that by 18 July almost 6,000 soldiers and 12,000 volunteers reached the area. They were soon discovered by Soviet air reconnaissance and surrounded by the NKVD. Commanders decided to split their units and try to break through to the Białystok area. However, most of the Home Army forces were caught and interned.

After dispersing Lt. Col. Maciej Kalenkiewicz "Kotwicz" remained in the forests around the city with approximately 80-100 soldiers until early August. On 21 August, Kalenkiewicz's unit was engaged by the NKVD expeditionary forces, further reinforced by the NKVD Intelligence-Search Unit 3, Battalion 32, commanded by NKVD's Captain Shulkha, and Capt. Tshikin of the Regional NKVD detachment. During the battle, 39 Home Army Soldiers, including Major Kalenkiewicz were killed.

See also

References

  1. ^ (English) G J Ashworth (1991). War and the City. London: Routledge. pp. 108. ISBN 0-415-05347-1. http://books.google.com/books?visbn=0415053471&id=8nA_txFp7GQC&pg=PA108&lpg=PA108&q=Wilno&vq=Wilno&dq=War+and+the+City&sig=FksPAUjJmgaHTdKHXF0RdIY3Mzs. 
  2. ^ (English) Anthony James Joes (2004). Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency. University Press of Kentucky. pp. 47. ISBN 0-8131-2339-9. http://books.google.com/books?visbn=0813123399&id=IoCsbXb03bUC&pg=PA47&lpg=PA47&dq=Wilno+uprising+1944&sig=DNr9UY9V82HVlcBxfCJJ_CKKfiE. 
  3. ^ (English) Michael Alfred Peszke (2004). The Polish Underground Army, the Western Allies, and the Failure of Strategic Unity in World War II. McFarland & Company. pp. 146. ISBN 0-7864-2009-X. http://books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN078642009X&id=zhb2doihL1wC&pg=PA146&lpg=PA146&q=Wilno+uprising+1944&vq=Wilno+uprising+1944&dq=Wilno+uprising+1944&sig=PyfbCJOmvAL0VzoQu0DofZY-Pao. 
  4. ^ (English) Jan M. Ciechanowski (2002). The Warsaw Rising of 1944. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 206–208. ISBN 0-521-89441-7. http://books.google.com/books?visbn=0521894417&id=2kvvMiclgVMC&pg=PA207&lpg=PA208&printsec=8&vq=Wilno&dq=Wilno+uprising+1944&sig=dssBKL8F-Lf2eujhSc78M91fDmU. 
  5. ^ (English) Tadeusz Piotrowski (1997). Poland's Holocaust. McFarland & Company. ISBN 0-7864-0371-3. http://books.google.com/books?visbn=0786403713&id=A4FlatJCro4C&pg=PA99&lpg=PA99&q=Wilno+1944&vq=Wilno+1944&dq=Wilno+uprising+1944&sig=a4_dBoxddfKo3IA4RmY-CftNPlM. 

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